 Opinion essay written on October 2020 regarding the following statement: "Illiberal democracy is an enhanced form of democracy: freed of constitutional constraints, Government can be fully responsive to the will of the majority" Written by: Emma Velasquez Mariucci  A controversial term has been stirring the political and constitutional atmosphere for the past 20 years: illiberal democracy. These two words seem to be contradicting, yet one has to be extremely precautious when analyzing them. This concept’s relevance is believed to date back to 1997, when journalist and political scientist Fareed Zakaria published an essay titled The Rise of Illiberal Democracy. The possibility of this concept being applied in real-world situations was first discussed when the author stated that “Democracy is flourishing; constitutional liberalism is not.”[1] This affirmation led many political scientists to consider a transformation in the type of democracy commonly implemented. Since the 1970s, the form of government that had prevailed in the western hemisphere, and that was seen as a worldwide guideline, was liberal democracy[2]. Nevertheless, new evidence has showed that countries are considering implementing different forms of governments. A study made in 2019 by V-dem exhibited that “For the first time since 2001, democracies are no longer in the majority […] the average global decline in liberal democracy in 2019 is more pronounced than was found in last year’s Democracy Report.”[3] Liberal states are being replaced, and as a consequence, illiberal democracies have emerged.  The liberal state is “characterised by… the protection of rights and freedoms” and “founded upon…the principle of separation of powers”[1]. On the other hand, illiberal democracies are defined as “democratically elected regimes, often ones that have been re-elected or reaffirmed through referenda [which] are routinely ignoring constitutional limits on their power and depriving their citizens of basic rights and freedoms”.[2] One might think that the deprivation of basic rights and freedoms leads to a non-democratic regime. But because illiberal democracies hold elections “which are more or less fair and uncorrupted … and the elected government does represent the interests of the majority of the population”[3], they cannot be classified as autocracies. When looking at the definition of democracy, it’s crucial to understand it as a conceptual definition, where democracy is a mechanism of the legitimization of power[1]. As a consequence, although illiberal democracies are often described as a paradox, “liberalism, either as a conception of political liberty […], may have coincided with the rise of democracy. But it has never been immutably or unambiguously linked to its practice.”[2]Consequently, autocracies can be liberal and democracies can be illiberal.  As stated above, illiberal democracies are in fact a democracy. However, to claim that "Illiberal democracy is an enhanced form of democracy: freed of constitutional constraints, Government can be fully responsive to the will of the majority" is not only erroneous, but outrageous. Illiberal democracies, through the pretext of being responsive to the will of the majority, end up imposing their believes on the citizens, completely wiping out individualism. These regimes destroy sincere and unrestrained civilian participation in political decisions; they oppress and exploit, while at the same time impose an impression of being freed of constitutional constrains. This essay will demonstrate how illiberal democracies are not an enhanced form of democracy because a state that seeks limitless power, silences all true opposition and controls the media is a selfish, dishonest and ruthless state.  Countries such as Russia, Hungary, Poland and Venezuela have recently chosen a different path from liberalism. Vladimir Putin, Russia’s head of state, expressed in an interview made by the Financial Times that liberalism has “become obsolete”, and that the “liberal idea” had “outlived its purpose.”[1] But, when talking about illiberal democracies, Hungary is the exemplar. In 2010, the Hungarian democracy once established in 1989 was fundamentally transformed into an illiberal democracy when the Fidesz party won the elections. Due to a very disproportionate electoral system, the political party obtained two-thirds majority in the parliamentary elections “with just 52% of the popular vote”[2]. These elections at first seemed shocking and abrupt, yet historical events indicate an accumulated social discontent.  In order to understand the results obtained in the 2010 elections, it’s crucial to understand the context that led to them. Over 30 years ago, Hungary “cut a hole in the Iron Curtain”[1] by allowing East Germans to cross the border into Austria. This placed them as front-runners in the protests for democratic transitions. From 1989 to 1990, Hungary’s once one-party state was replaced by a pluralist democracy, becoming a democratic regime. Alongside, Hungary’s economy shifted from a planned to a market economy. Although this shift was considered constructive and beneficial by western democracies, Hungarians’ ranked this new regime inferior to the previous one[2]. With the market-economy global crisis in 2008, a built-up lack of trust in political institutions and a rise in unemployment since the transition to democracy, Hungary’s citizens began undermining the quality of liberal democracy. The growing discontent affected the citizens’ perspective on the definition of democracy. “For the majority of Hungarians democracy is identified with financial advancement and existential security.”[3] Since Hungary had an underperforming, stagnant economy, and the economic growth expected by the citizens was not being met, the probability of a regime change was high.  The Fidesz party, led by prime minister Viktor Orbán, have since been establishing an illiberal democracy. As soon as the party was elected, alarmingly questionable changes to the structure of the state and the distribution of power began. The Constitutional Court, who was once the principal entity that limited the power of the executive branch, was suddenly deemed unnecessary because it “no longer needed its exceptionally wide scope of jurisdiction”[1]. Because of this declaration made by a Fidesz leader, the Constitutional Court no longer held power to rule on tax and budgetary matters. Since the president, who was the other democratic institution able to exert constitutional control, was also from the Fidesz party, Orbán and the Fidesz party managed to successfully dismantle “a large part of check and balances”[2]. The party ensured that the executive power was boundless and competition-free.  On the other hand, the Fidesz also implemented a policy where the country’s pre-existing liberal media structure and regulations were replaced by “a self-censoring, pro-government centralized media”[1]. Citizens are oblivious to any point of view that disapproves or defies the government, and are easily manipulated by the regime. If the information received by the inhabitants is limited and altered, then the will of the majority is non-existent, because it’s imposed. The concerning characteristics of illiberal democracies reinforce the statement that illiberal democracies don’t enhance democracy. While elections are held, they are just a façade to disguise all the abuse and despotism present in illiberal democracies. It has been evidenced that democracy comes in waves[1], but are we experiencing the first illiberal democracy wave in history? Work cited:
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AuthorEmma Velasquez Mariucci 
Hi! My name is Emma Velasquez, a Colombian girl studying Economics in Milan. I hope you enjoy my articles! In order to learn more about me, you can click on the "Learn more about the author" button located at the top of the web page!
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